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Following Strawson, many philosophers have claimed that holding someone responsible necessitates 
its being appropriate to feel or express the negative reactive attitudes (e.g., resentment) toward her. 
This view, while compelling, is unable to capture the full range of cases in which we hold others 
responsible in ordinary life. Consider the parent who holds her five-year-old responsible for not 
teasing his sister, or the therapist who holds her patient responsible for avoiding self-injurious 
behavior. Holding responsible in such cases requires enforcing normative expectations, but these 
norms can (and typically should) be enforced without involving the negative reactive attitudes. To 
demonstrate this, I consider how responsibility attributions function in psychotherapy, as well as in 
other contexts where the negative reactive attitudes do not have a natural home.  
 
1. Introduction 
An undertheorized aspect of our responsibility practices is that we routinely hold agents 
responsible even when they are impaired or immature (i.e., so-called “marginal agents”).1 This 
holding responsible is an essential part of parenting, teaching, and psychotherapy, for example. A 
parent who chose not to hold his daughter responsible for anything merely because she was a child, 
or a therapist who chose not to hold her patients responsible for coming to the majority of their 
appointments as scheduled, would seem misguided and even negligent. Yet standard philosophical 
approaches to responsibility often identify being responsible with the possession of certain 
psychological capacities, such as rationality and self-control, in which marginal agents are deficient. 
Can these theories of responsibility be reconciled with our responsibility practices? If not, how 
should we understand what the parent and the therapist take themselves to be doing?  
In general, the distinction between being responsible and holding responsible has proved 
helpful for untangling various judgments about responsibility. Roughly, to be responsible is to satisfy 
whatever conditions are necessary for responsible agency; one holds someone responsible for an 
action or attitude when one holds her to account for it. In “On Being Responsible and Holding 
Responsible,” Angela Smith characterizes this distinction as follows: “…to say that a person is 
morally responsible for some thing is to say that it can be attributed to her in the way that is required 
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in order for it to be a basis for moral appraisal.” In contrast, ‘holding responsible’ refers to 
“something not about the relation between an agent and her actions or attitudes, but about our 
relation to the agent and our (usually negative) assessment of her conduct”.2  
Much of the literature about holding responsible concerns whether being responsible or 
holding responsible is prior (either explanatorily or metaphysically speaking).3 My primary focus in 
this paper, however, lies elsewhere. In “Freedom and Resentment,” Strawson emphasizes the 
responses we are inclined to have toward people we regard as responsible agents (“the range of 
reactive feelings and attitudes which belong to involvement or participation with others in inter-
personal human relationships…”) as fundamental to understanding the nature of responsibility.4 
Following Strawson, many philosophers have claimed that holding someone responsible necessitates 
its being appropriate to feel or express the negative reactive attitudes (e.g., resentment, indignation) 
toward him.5 This view, while compelling, is ultimately unable to capture the full range of cases in 
which we hold others responsible in ordinary life.6 Consider the parent who holds her five-year-old 
responsible for not teasing his sister, or the therapist who holds her patient responsible for avoiding 
self-injurious behavior. Paradigmatically, these instances of holding responsible involve enforcing 
normative expectations, but an appreciation of the agent in question’s immaturity or impairment 
leads this enforcement not to involve the negative reactive attitudes in any way. These cases also 
suggest the importance of another aspect of Strawson’s project, namely that our responsibility 
practices are bound up with our participation in interpersonal relationships. These relationships are 
an important source of normative expectations, and therefore the site of a special kind of authority 
to hold one another responsible.7 
My aim here is to offer a characterization of holding responsible that allows us to appreciate 
and understand the wide range of forms this notion takes in practice. Before arriving at such a view, 
I will first describe some alternatives. I will begin with Strawson’s characterization of responsibility, 
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focusing especially on the connection between responsibility and the reactive attitudes on his view. I 
will then consider an argument from R. Jay Wallace that responsibility is only connected to some of 
the things Strawson characterizes as reactive attitudes (in particular, the negative reactive attitudes – 
that is, resentment, indignation, and guilt, and not e.g., gratitude). Wallace argues that this 
connection is forged via the notion of normative demands and expectations; agents are responsible 
when they can be sensitive to these expectations, and violating them justifies another’s feeling or 
expressing the negative reactive attitudes.8 I want to endorse Wallace’s suggestion that responsibility 
is essentially related to normative expectations but reject the connection he draws between holding 
responsible and the justifiability of the negative reactive attitudes. To demonstrate this point, I 
consider how responsibility attributions function in psychotherapy (and discuss my view on this 
subject in relation to Hanna Pickard’s), as well as in other contexts where it does not seem that the 
negative reactive attitudes have a natural home.  
With these considerations in place, I then lay out my positive view of holding responsible as 
essentially involving the enforcement of norms, where norm enforcement takes on a much wider 
variety of forms than is often appreciated.9 In particular, I argue that one can enforce a norm by 
praising someone’s having met it or reminding someone of its existence in a forward-looking way, as 
well as by responding to norm violations; these other responses are just as central to holding 
responsible as blame is. This broader theoretical conception of holding responsible affords us a 
better understanding of our responsibility practices, in which marginal agents are held responsible 
despite often being exempted from some range of the reactive attitudes. Moreover, this view of 
holding responsible makes room for a more expansive characterization of who counts as a 
responsible agent – that is, for what it means to be responsible. Ultimately, I claim that cases 
involving these agents show us how being and being appropriately held responsible are inextricably 
linked with normative expectations, which importantly include those that arise in our interpersonal 
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relationships. Though I came to this view of responsibility in an attempt to do justice to cases 
involving marginal agents, I will go on to argue that it in fact applies to all of us. Nevertheless, it is 
of particular importance for understanding how our responsibility practices involve members of 
vulnerable populations. 
 
2. Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes 
In “Freedom and Resentment,” Strawson considers whether determinism, if true, 
undermines the legitimacy of our responsibility practices. He argues that the best way to resolve this 
question is to consider the character of these practices (including how we respond to people we 
regard as responsible agents, and when we excuse or exempt people from being held responsible in 
everyday life) and to see if believing the truth of determinism rationally requires us to opt out of 
them. Strawson suggests that regarding someone as a responsible agent disposes us to have what he 
calls the reactive attitudes toward them, which are “…essentially reactions to the quality of others’ 
wills toward us, as manifested in their behaviour: to their good or ill will or indifference or lack of 
concern”.10 Resentment, for example, is “…a reaction to injury or indifference”.11 
Strawson contrasts the reactive attitudes with the objective attitude, which we 
characteristically take up with those we cannot properly regard as responsible agents due to 
impairment or immaturity.12 As he writes,  
“The objective attitude may be emotionally toned in many ways, but not in all ways: it may 
include repulsion or fear, it may include pity or even love, though not all kinds of love. But it 
cannot include the range of reactive feelings and attitudes which belong to involvement or 
participation with others in interpersonal human relationships; it cannot include resentment, 
gratitude, forgiveness, anger, or the sort of love which two adults can sometimes be said to 
feel reciprocally, for each other. If your attitude toward someone is wholly objective, then 
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though you may fight him, you cannot quarrel with him, and though you may talk to him, 
even negotiate with him, you cannot reason with him. You can at most pretend to quarrel, or 
to reason, with him.”13 
The fundamental connection between responsibility and the reactive attitudes that Strawson 
urges us to recognize is not only logical, but also psychological; when we regard others as capable of 
responsible agency, and as expressing something about the quality of their wills in their behavior, we 
are disposed to respond with the reactive attitudes in light of what they have done. This orientation 
toward others is necessary for one to be able to engage in the kind of intimacy that Strawson says 
defines interpersonal human relationships, the relationships that we have with other participants in 
the moral community. When we are led to believe that others are not able to participate in this kind 
of relationship, our suspension of the reactive attitudes is a natural consequence of the shift in the 
way that we see them. We are, when taking up the objective attitude, no longer prone to viewing that 
person as a fellow community member, but rather “to see[ing] him, perhaps, as an object of social 
policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range of senses, might be called treatment; as something 
certainly to be taken account, perhaps precautionary account, of; to be managed or handled or cured 
or trained; perhaps simply to be avoided…”14, 15  
Strawson describes a set of conditions that make us inclined to excuse or exempt people 
from the reactive attitudes, including ignorance, coercion, immaturity, or psychological abnormality. 
These conditions are meant to be familiar to us from ordinary life as reasons to abstain from 
responding as we normally would with someone we consider a responsible agent. Finding out that 
an agent was ignorant or coerced casts doubt on whether she has genuinely manifested the quality of 
will we initially took her to have (e.g., good will or indifference). An agent’s immaturity and 
psychological abnormality, on the other hand, may present obstacles to her participation in 
interpersonal relationships such that we are no longer prone to feel the reactive attitudes toward 
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her.16 These claims of Strawson’s are intended to be justified by reflection on our existing 
responsibility practices, and not by independent theoretical investigation of what conditions are 
required for responsible agency. Gary Watson elaborates on this point when he says, “Holding 
responsible is as natural and primitive in human life as friendship and animosity, sympathy and 
antipathy. It rests on needs and concerns that are not so much to be justified as acknowledged.”17  
In Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, R. Jay Wallace takes himself to be following in the 
Strawsonian tradition of considering our responsibility practices as the ground for understanding 
what responsibility is and could be. Ultimately, he argues that being a responsible agent is 
fundamentally a matter of possessing normative competence (i.e., in Wallace’s terminology, the 
powers of reflective self-control); in particular, it is a matter of possessing “the power to grasp moral 
reasons and the power to control…[one’s]…behavior in accordance with them”.18 But he arrives at 
this claim by considering when it would be fair to hold individuals responsible in the sense of their 
being appropriate objects of the reactive attitudes, where the relevant norms of fairness are 
supposed to be drawn from everyday life.19 For example, Wallace claims that these norms of fairness 
dictate that resentment is appropriate just when someone is capable of understanding moral reasons 
and capable of guiding her actions to be in accord with them, but has failed to do so without 
apparent excuse.  
Wallace also holds a distinct view about the connection between responsibility and the 
reactive attitudes. In particular, he claims that Strawson’s characterization of the reactive attitudes is 
much too broad.  In support of this claim, he argues that Strawson and his commentators tend to 
elide two distinctions: “…the distinction between reactive attitudes and other attitudes one might 
take toward persons…” on the one hand, and the distinction between the range of attitudes that are 
associated with the participant stance versus the objective stance on the other.20 Though certain 
kinds of love, forgiveness, and gratitude may only be felt toward those with whom we take up the 
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participant stance, it does not follow that those attitudes bear the same kind of relationship to 
responsibility as resentment, indignation, and guilt.  
Wallace insists that these latter attitudes, unlike the others that Strawson calls reactive 
attitudes, derive their distinctive role in our responsibility practices from their connection to 
normative expectations. As he writes, “Resentment, indignation, and guilt are essentially tied to 
expectations that we hold ourselves and others to; susceptibility to these emotions is what 
constitutes holding someone to an expectation. This mutual dependence of emotion and expectation 
distinguishes the reactive attitudes…”21 For Wallace, possession of the capacities required to be 
properly held to normative expectations is constitutive of responsible agency, and resentment, 
indignation, and guilt (i.e., the negative reactive attitudes) are fitting responses to violations of such 
expectations. “To hold someone to an expectation,” Wallace writes, “is to be susceptible to a certain 
range of emotions (i.e., the negative reactive attitudes) if the expectation is violated or to believe it 
would be appropriate for one to feel those emotions if the expectation is violated.”22 
But Wallace and Strawson are both committed to considering our theories of responsibility 
as answerable to the ways the concept of responsibility is understood and instantiated in ordinary 
life. If we take this commitment seriously, we must recognize that there are individuals who 
participate in our responsibility practices, and who satisfy Wallace’s condition of being properly 
subject to normative expectations, who nonetheless often are and should be shielded from the 
negative reactive attitudes. I will sketch what I mean by this briefly here and return to these 
considerations later on. Consider, for example, how parents hold young children responsible for 
sharing their toys or behaving themselves in public, how an alcoholic’s therapist might hold them 
responsible for a relapse after a period of sobriety, or how an employer might hold an employee 
responsible for completing the tasks associated with their job. While holding responsible may take a 
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number of different forms in these situations, they need not be seen as situations where resentment 
or indignation could be appropriate.  
What unites these cases is the fact that there are norms that hold between the parties in 
question and holding responsible involves the enforcement of those norms. In other words, we 
ought to accept Wallace’s claim that holding responsible appears to be essentially connected to 
normative expectations. We should resist his suggestion, however, that enforcing those expectations 
necessarily involves the appropriateness of the negative reactive attitudes. This is not to deny that we 
are often prone to feel these attitudes toward those we hold responsible, or that those attitudes are 
responses to our sense of the other person as an agent. It is rather to question whether holding 
someone responsible means that it must be appropriate to feel the negative reactive attitudes toward 
her. If holding responsible is, as Watson suggests, a means “of expressing our concerns and 
demands about our treatment of one another,” it is only natural for that expression to take on 
emotional significance.23 But those concerns about our treatment of others cut both ways; though a 
parent might be irritated by his child’s failure to share, or a therapist might be disappointed at her 
patient’s relapse, they should (and in many cases do) also recognize the vulnerability of the parties in 
question, and the difficulties these parties may have in trying to satisfy the expectations placed on 
them. This recognition in turn mitigates the propensity the parent or therapist might have to find it 
appropriate to feel, much less express, the negative reactive attitudes. 
 
3. Responsibility in Psychotherapy 
In order to make this claim more vivid, let us consider the role of responsibility in 
therapeutic relationships. Finding a sense of ‘holding responsible’ that is appropriate to therapeutic 
relationships requires steering between the Scylla and Charybdis of underestimating the agency of 
people with mental illness on the one hand and viewing them as fitting objects of their therapists’ 
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affective blame on the other.24 On the one hand, it is common to hear statements such as the 
following: “Like diabetes and Alzheimer’s, depression is an illness that befalls you. You are not 
responsible…or to blame [for that]. Your only responsibility is to get treatment and, once this has 
begun, to stay with the therapy until you are well again.”25 On the other hand, clinicians do in some 
cases blame their patients for their symptoms. Richard Friedman, a psychiatrist, gives one such 
example involving a patient with chronic depression who had been referred to him by another 
provider,  
“…a man in his early 30s, who had suffered from depression since his teenage years. In six 
years of psychotherapy, he had been given nearly every antidepressant under the sun, but his 
mood hadn’t budged. Weeping in my office one day, he explained that he was depressed 
because he was a failure and a whiner. ‘Even my therapist agreed with me,’ he said. ‘She said 
that maybe I don’t want to get better.’”26   
Friedman reports that, “About a month later, I saw this patient respond remarkably well to a novel 
treatment. Free of depression at last, he was joyful and relieved — an odd reaction, you must admit, 
from someone who secretly wished to be ill.”27 
Friedman suggests that this impulse to blame patients for their symptoms can arise when 
therapists are frustrated with their behavior or lack of response to treatment, which can create serious 
obstacles to a therapeutic alliance. Consider, for example, this description of patients with personality 
disorders cited by Hanna Pickard, a social worker and philosopher: “In his landmark study of staff‘s 
attitudes to service users with personality disorder in three High Security Hospitals in the UK, Len 
Bowers suggests:  
‘The generally hopeless, pessimistic attitudes of carers can be seen to originate in the difficult 
behaviors of personality disorder patients. They bully, con, capitalize, divide, condition, and 
corrupt those around them. They make complaints over inconsequential or nonexistent issues 
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in order to manipulate staff. They can be seriously violent over unpredictable and objectively 
trivial events, or may harm and disfigure themselves in ways that have an intense emotional 
impact on staff. If this were not enough, they also behave in the same ways toward each other, 
provoking serious problems that the staff have to manage and contain.”28  
Pickard considers this description “in many ways accurate,” and she argues that it is vital for 
therapists to hold their patients with personality disorders responsible precisely because these 
conditions are “disorders of agency”.29 By this Pickard means, “Core diagnostic symptoms or 
maintaining factors of…[these] disorders…are actions and omissions: patterns of behavior central to 
the nature or maintenance of the condition. For instance, borderline personality disorder is 
diagnosed in part via deliberate self-harm and attempted suicide, reckless and impulsive behavior, 
substance use, violence, and outbursts of anger…”30 Pickard suggests that it is a mistake simply to 
see these individuals as suffering from diseases that befall them and thereby render them wholly 
incapable of being or being appropriately held responsible. But though she emphasizes the 
importance of responsibility in the treatment of personality disorders, she cautions against regarding 
these agents (and those in psychiatric treatment more generally) as appropriately subject to the full 
range of responsibility responses, including the negative reactive attitudes.  
Her proposal is that the appropriate stance for clinicians to take toward their patients 
involves holding them responsible but not blaming them for their behavior, even when that 
behavior is quite harmful to themselves and others, because blame is detrimental to the patient and 
to the therapeutic relationship. As she writes, “Blaming service users [i.e., psychiatric patients] may 
trigger feelings of rejection, anger, and self-blame, which bring heightened risk of disengagement 
from treatment, distrust and breach of the therapeutic alliance, relapse, and, with service users with 
personality disorder, potentially even self-harm or attempts at suicide: it is essential that compassion 
and empathy be maintained.”31 
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How exactly are we to make sense of the claim that patients with personality disorders are 
responsible for doing very bad things but are not to blame for them? In order to make out this 
position, Pickard insists that there is a familiar sense of ‘responsibility’ that is not moral or 
connected to the negative reactive attitudes. She describes this sense as follows: 
“Effective clinical treatment presupposes that service users are responsible for their behavior 
insofar as they have conscious knowledge of what they are doing, and can exercise choice 
and at least a degree of control over the behavior…[T]his is a traditional and commonsense 
idea about what it means to be responsible, applicable not only to service users, but to us all. 
This idea of responsibility is essentially linked, not to morality and the reactive attitudes, but 
to agency. Crucially, on this view, we are responsible for all our actions, whether or not they 
are right, wrong, or neutral from a moral point of view. We are responsible for our actions 
because we are their agents: insofar as we know what we are doing, and can exercise choice 
and control our behavior, what we do is up to us.”32 
Pickard argues that the sense of responsibility relevant to clinical contexts is non-moral because, 
“behaviors like self-harm, substance abuse, and obsessive rituals, can be damaging to the person 
without necessarily damaging others”.33 On her view, much of the behavior that clinicians should 
hold their patients responsible for is harmful, but it is not morally bad because it only or primarily 
affects themselves; she also suggests that such behavior is somewhat understandable as an 
expression of or method of coping with emotional distress.  
In addition, Pickard claims that if clinicians regarded their patients as morally at fault for 
their behavior, they would regard themselves as entitled to subject them to the negative reactive 
attitudes, which would undermine the effectiveness of their treatment. In some cases, Pickard argues 
that clinicians may appropriately form detached judgments that their patients are blameworthy when 
they cause harm to themselves or others without excuse, but this blame lacks the characteristic 
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‘sting’ of affective blame and so does not interfere with promoting that patient’s recovery. To clarify 
what she means by this ‘detached’ sense of blame, she considers how it occurs in parent-child 
relationships.  
“For instance,” she writes, “good parenting routinely involves pointing out when a child has 
shown disregard or ill will toward a sibling, and indeed imposing negative consequences for 
it. That is part of bringing up children to treat others, including rivals, with regard and 
respect. Sometimes, no doubt, parents do this in such a way that the child feels bad and 
blamed. But a loving parent can often help a child understand that their behavior toward a 
sibling is neither decent nor permitted, without the child feeling ‘stung’.”34 
In general, detached blame seems to involve a cognitive judgment that the person in question has 
caused harm, and an imposition of negative consequences, where those consequences are not 
intended to be of an emotional nature.   
I am broadly sympathetic to Pickard’s view about how it is appropriate to hold patients 
responsible without subjecting them to negative reactive attitudes in the context of therapeutic 
relationships. I believe, however, that we can (and should) understand the significance of this 
without invoking a different, non-moral sense of responsibility. Pickard’s argument that the sense of 
responsibility applicable to service users is non-moral depends on two assumptions about behaviors 
that are partially constitutive of disorders of agency: first, that they only or primarily cause harm to 
self rather than others, and second, that this means that they are not morally bad. Both of these 
claims are controversial and stand in need of further defense.  
More importantly, by invoking a non-moral sense of responsibility to understand what 
responsibility means in clinical contexts, Pickard leaves open the possibility that there is an 
important discontinuity between service users and the general adult population with respect to what 
it means for them to be responsible. This seems antithetical to her overall aim to humanize these 
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agents, as exemplified in the following passage: “As Angela Smith elegantly points out: ‘being held 
responsible is as much a privilege as it is a burden. It signals that we are a full participant in the 
moral community’.35 In other words, in holding service users with disorders of agency responsible, 
we treat them as one of us—as belonging with us, as equals.”36  
Happily, one can understand the sense of responsibility relevant to clinical contexts as moral 
without that entailing the appropriateness of the negative reactive attitudes. Indeed, the example 
Pickard gives of detached blame in a parent-child relationship still seems to be moral blame; the 
child in question has “shown disregard or ill will toward a sibling,” though the kind of blame that is 
warranted avoids the characteristic ‘sting’ associated with the negative reactive attitudes.37 In some 
cases that arise in clinical contexts, it seems fitting to recognize that psychiatric patients are 
responsible for wrongful actions they perform but excuse them from affective blame on the grounds 
that they do not deserve it given the nature of the difficulties that they face. In other cases, where 
the individual in question doesn’t have an excuse, one might still think that therapists are obliged (in 
light of professional norms, and perhaps other considerations) to exhibit a degree of emotional 
detachment toward their patients that is incompatible with affective blame. Thus, holding 
responsible may entirely avoid the negative reactive attitudes, even if one is still considering moral 
responsibility.38 
Another feature of Pickard’s view that is worth mentioning is her emphasis on the 
instrumental goods associated with the stance of responsibility without affective blame in clinical 
contexts. That is, she argues that holding responsible is beneficial, and the characteristic ‘sting’ 
associated with the negative reactive attitudes is damaging, to patients and to therapeutic 
relationships. These claims strike me as intuitive and important, and I have no interest in disputing 
them. But I also want to bring out something Pickard touches on but does not develop in much 
detail, namely that recognizing someone’s agency also constitutes a way of showing her respect; this 
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undoubtedly influences the quality of a relationship, therapeutic or otherwise. Such a recognition is 
fundamentally worthwhile not just because it promotes good behavior or psychological health, but 
because it is a part of treating the individual in question as a person. 
Arguably, part of what makes therapy effective (when it is) is that therapeutic relationships 
are intended to serve as sources of norms, whose content and conditions of enforcement are fitting 
given the aims of treatment. A good therapist will recognize her patients’ strengths and abilities 
alongside their vulnerabilities and impairments, and therefore recognize that both therapist and 
patient have a role to play in determining what those aims should be and how they might be 
achieved. This collaborative work means not only that therapists are better positioned to enforce 
norms with their patients in an understanding and compassionate way, but that therapists and 
patients have a special authority to hold each other responsible that stems from the norms created in 
their relationship. For example, if a patient has pledged to her therapist to abstain from self-injurious 
behavior for a length of time and falls short of this expectation, her therapist has grounds to hold 
her responsible that strangers and acquaintances, and perhaps even some people in close 
relationships with her lack. This holding responsible, again, need not involve the negative reactive 
attitudes or other harsh treatment, but might involve a reminder of the relevant expectations or an 
investigation of what the patient can do to help herself uphold them going forward.39 These 
responses reflect an appreciation of the difficulties associated with recovery, but also the role of the 
patient’s own agency in making recovery possible.  
 
4. The Core of Holding Responsible 
What does it mean to treat someone as a person by recognizing her agency? On Strawson’s 
view, we do this when we take up the participant stance toward her, when we see her, “as a morally 
responsible agent, as a term of moral relationships, as a member of the moral community”.40 This 
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way of regarding another person, he claims, creates a propensity to feel the reactive attitudes, which 
he characterizes as, “essentially natural human reactions to the good or ill will or indifference of 
others toward us, as displayed in their attitudes and actions”.41 Though we can suspend the reactive 
attitudes temporarily even with those whom we regard as responsible agents in order to “[seek] 
refuge from the strains of involvement,” Strawson argues that this could not be our normal mode of 
responding to these agents.42  
It is unclear whether, on Strawson’s view, one could suspend some range of the reactive 
attitudes while nevertheless having others. For example, it is unclear whether he views it as 
psychologically possible to feel emotions like gratitude or admiration at a person’s good will without 
also being prone to feel resentment or indignation at her ill will or indifference. Thus, Strawson may 
or may not be willing to say that we are able to take up the participant stance toward those whom we 
also regard as properly shielded from the negative reactive attitudes. Wallace, on the other hand, 
separates the participant stance (i.e., the stance we take up toward fellow persons) from holding 
responsible. He argues that only the latter is to be identified with either feeling the negative reactive 
attitudes in light of a normative expectation’s being violated or judging it appropriate to feel those 
attitudes in such circumstances.  
Rather than responding directly to Strawson’s and Wallace’s views on this subject, I would 
first like to take a step back and reflect on the variety of ways in which we respond in ordinary life to 
those we regard “as a term of moral relationships,” and what unifies those responses. After 
considering several cases meant to be representative of this variety, I will develop a distinct positive 
characterization of what it means to hold responsible, which I take to be connected to treating 
someone as a person.43 Ultimately, I want to accept Wallace’s view that to hold someone responsible 
is to hold her to normative expectations, but to question whether this bears any obvious connection 
to the negative reactive attitudes. In clinical contexts like the ones Pickard describes, for example, 
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there seem to be genuine instances of holding responsible where the parties in question don’t feel, or 
judge it appropriate to feel, those attitudes. Moreover, we should not think this is unique to 
therapeutic relationships. I will begin by discussing a therapeutic case, before describing other 
examples that also support this view of holding responsible. 
Consider how a therapist might respond to an addict who has relapsed after a period of 
sobriety. Though it is understandable that she might feel some degree of disappointment at her 
patient’s behavior, it seems inappropriate for her to meet this situation with anger or resentment, or 
to regard herself as justified in doing so. Recovering from an addiction is extremely difficult, and 
relapse is a common part of this process; fully appreciating this seems incompatible with viewing 
anger as an appropriate response to this patient. Nonetheless, I claim (with Pickard) that it is 
appropriate for her to hold her patient responsible. It is a common experience for addicts who 
relapse to feel that they are back at square one with respect to their recovery, and to question 
whether they have it in them to get better. By counseling her patient not to discount the value of his 
previous abstinence and letting him know that she still expects him to move forward in his recovery, 
she reminds him of norms that she still regards him as capable of upholding despite his relapse. 
Consider, too, how a father might respond to a four-year-old child who refuses to share her 
toys with her sister. Again, it seems inappropriate for him to respond by feeling or expressing the 
negative reactive attitudes, or thinking they are justified in this situation. After all, it is typical for 
young children to need to learn they ought to share, and it would be excessively harsh to respond to 
normal development with resentment or anger.  But it does seem appropriate for the father to hold 
his daughter responsible, which might involve explaining the value of sharing, or asking his daughter 
to imagine what it would be like if no one shared with her, as well as the imposition of consequences 
(e.g., taking the toy away temporarily). In doing so, the father enforces a norm that his daughter has 
violated (e.g., “You have to share with your sister because that is fair, and if you don’t, I will take the 
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toy away”), but without the kind of cognitive and emotional responses Wallace treats as constitutive 
of holding someone responsible.44 
These cases share some important features. First, they are situations where it seems fitting 
for the therapist and parent respectively to hold responsible without this involving the negative 
reactive attitudes in any way. Second, this holding responsible involves the enforcement of norms 
that have previously been violated by the parties in question. Third, these cases involve marginal 
agents – that is, individuals who are deficient in the cognitive and volitional capacities often 
associated with responsible agency. One might assume that these deficiencies alone serve to explain 
why the addict and the child are not fitting targets of the negative reactive attitudes. According to 
this line of thought, though it may be appropriate to act as if we hold them responsible, they are not 
responsible in the same sense or to the same degree as psychologically normal adults. Thus, one 
might worry that it is illicit to infer from these cases that holding responsible properly understood 
does not require feeling or regarding oneself as justified in feeling the negative reactive attitudes. I 
do not share this view about the responsibility of marginal agents. As I see it, marginal agency is not 
something that always excuses one from blame for norm violations, but rather something that 
shapes the norms one is held to and tone of norm enforcement. But more immediately, I also 
believe there are examples of holding non-marginal agents responsible that do not involve the 
presence or justifiability of the negative reactive attitudes. Let us consider one below. 
Imagine that you are an employer and that one of your employees has recently lost his 
mother. His grief is interfering with his doing his job effectively, and you need him to complete one 
particular project or he will lose an important client. Although this is a delicate situation, it seems 
appropriate for you to hold him responsible for completing the tasks associated with his job. You 
might do this by reminding him that he knows this project better than anyone else in the office, and 
though you know he is having a difficult time, you expect him to be able to meet his deadlines; if he 
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can’t, you will have to give the account to someone else. But assuming he falls short of these 
expectations, it seems excessively harsh to see anger or resentment as a fitting response. Here again, 
holding responsible involves the enforcement of a norm – in this case, a norm with respect to his 
job performance, but does not involve the justifiability of the negative reactive attitudes.45 
In this case, as well as the two I considered above, the negative reactive attitudes are an inapt 
response, and a willingness to feel those attitudes or see them as justified seems to evince an 
impatience with or lack of compassion for the person in question. But the responses that the parent, 
therapist, and employer in fact have are nevertheless instances of holding responsible. They involve 
the enforcement of norms, and the recognition of the person in question as an agent - in particular, 
one who is capable of appreciating and upholding the relevant expectations. This norm enforcement 
that lies at the core of holding responsible is not merely a way of incentivizing good behavior, but of 
showing the other party a kind of respect. It reflects a presumption of reciprocity between the 
person holding responsible and the person being held responsible – that you can expect something 
of each other, and are able to appreciate the grounds for those expectations in your relationship. 
Notice that if this is how we understand what it means to hold someone responsible, we do 
not only do this when we regard her as having violated the relevant norm. We also hold her 
responsible when we praise or give credit to her for doing what she was supposed to, or draw her 
attention to the relevant norm in a forward-looking way.46 As children get older and are told that 
they are entrusted with more responsibilities by their parents (say, to walk themselves home from 
school safely and without too many diversions), they are thereby being held responsible on this view. 
Similarly, one is held responsible when one takes on a new job and is told on the first day what one’s 
responsibilities are – that is, what others expect of one in this role. Or suppose someone sets a goal 
of abstaining from drinking for a certain length of time and succeeds in doing so. Her therapist’s 
 19 
praising her for this constitutes an instance of holding responsible (provided she would also have 
been held responsible if she had not met the relevant expectations). 
The idea that the sorts of cases described in the paragraph above are instances of holding 
responsible lends further support to the idea that holding responsible does not necessitate the 
appropriateness of the negative reactive attitudes. For these are clearly cases where the negative 
reactive attitudes are not called for. Though they involve normative demands, those demands have 
either been satisfied, or the person in question has not had a chance to satisfy them yet. In addition, 
I have described cases here that involve both marginal and non-marginal agents, and the sense in 
which they are held responsible is fundamentally the same.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In summary, I want to highlight four aspects of my view of holding responsible. First, on 
this view, the core of holding someone responsible is regarding her as accountable for upholding a 
norm. Second, we do this not only when norms have been violated, but also when they have been 
upheld, or when we want to remind someone of that norm in a forward-looking way. Third, holding 
someone responsible does not thereby mean it is appropriate to feel, or regard oneself as justified in 
feeling, the negative reactive attitudes. Finally, this conception of holding responsible applies to 
marginal and non-marginal agents alike.  
 I began developing this view about the nature of holding responsible in order to do justice to 
how we hold marginal agents responsible, which frequently has nothing obviously to do with the 
negative reactive attitudes. The view I arrived at shares elements with both Wallace’s and Pickard’s 
views of holding responsible. In particular, I think Wallace is right to emphasize the connection 
between holding responsible and normative demands, although I disagree that to hold someone 
responsible, one must judge that they have fallen short of such demands, or that they are thereby the 
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appropriate object of one’s resentment or indignation. Likewise, I endorse Pickard’s suggestions that 
one can hold someone responsible while nonetheless seeing it as appropriate to protect them from 
the characteristic ‘sting’ associated with the negative reactive attitudes, and that this is an important 
part of therapeutic relationships. Unlike Pickard, however, I claim that the sense of responsibility 
that is operative in clinical contexts is garden-variety accountability. 
 The motivation I have given for my positive view of holding responsible primarily comes 
from the examples I have given, which represent some important and undertheorized ways we use 
this concept in ordinary life. These cases, I think, demonstrate the value of understanding holding 
responsible as broader than seeing someone as the fitting object of the negative reactive attitudes, or 
even as deserving of blame. But one might worry that I have not given sufficient argument that my 
view describes the core of holding responsible. In particular, one might question whether the 
examples I have given are ones where the therapist, parent, and employer genuinely hold the 
relevant party responsible, as opposed to acting as if they do for pragmatic reasons. I see no reason 
to describe these cases as instances of pretense; they seem to involve perfectly reasonable responses 
to another person in light of regarding her as subject to a norm. The only motivation for resisting 
the claim that these cases are instances of holding responsible seems to come from including the 
justifiability of the negative reactive attitudes in the definition of holding responsible. Such a 
definition would beg the question against my view. 
The concept of responsibility surely functions in a number of ways in ordinary life and 
philosophical theorizing. Nonetheless, I take myself to have identified a central strain of 
responsibility understood in terms of accountability, which is essential to correctly understanding 
what is going on in the cases I have considered.47 In other words, this conception of holding 
responsible is an important one, even if it is not exhaustive. In particular, by rejecting the idea that 
holding someone responsible means thereby finding it appropriate to be angry with her, my view 
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makes it clear that we do in fact hold marginal agents responsible. Moreover, careful attention to 
these practices shows us how to understand Strawson’s powerful suggestion that responsibility bears 
an essential connection to interpersonal relationships even if holding responsible is broadened 
beyond cases that involve the negative reactive attitudes. Relationships are sources of norms, and 
make it possible to adjust and enforce expectations in accordance with our understanding of each 
other.   
All of this allows us to begin to see that when we hold young children, for example, 
responsible, we are not merely pretending that they are responsible in order to teach them how to 
behave. Rather, we are engaging in the very same kind of practice that we engage in with non-
marginal agents, namely enforcing norms to which the agent in question is subject. Recognizing this 
same underlying structure in our responsibility responses to marginal and non-marginal agents in 
turn allows us to appreciate the continuity between these agents as participants in the moral 
community.  
The Ohio State University 
 
NOTES 
 
1 By responsibility practices, I mean to refer to our evaluations of people as responsible or not, and the ways 
in which we hold people responsible in light of their actions and attitudes. Examples of such practices include 
blaming, punishing, crediting, demanding an apology, and reminding someone what we expect of them going 
forward. I use the term “marginal agent” following David Shoemaker, who characterizes marginal agency as 
occurring “at the boundaries of our interpersonal community, where agents tend to strike us as eligible for 
some responsibility responses but not others” (Shoemaker (2015) 4). This category includes a wide variety of 
agents, such as children, addicts, adults with cognitive disabilities, etc. I am somewhat ambivalent about this 
terminology because I view it as an underestimation of the agents in question, but I use it because I take my 
views to be in dialogue with Shoemaker’s, and for ease of exposition. 
 
2 Smith, “On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible,” 467-8.  
 
3 For a range of views on this topic, see Brink and Nelkin, “Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility,” 
Smith, “On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible,” Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, 
Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil,” Shoemaker, “Response-Dependent Responsibility” and 
McKenna, Conversation and Responsibility. 
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4 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 10. 
 
5 For example, Wallace’s Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments and McKenna’s Conversation and Responsibility. It is 
also worth noting here that though Strawson drew responsibility theorists’ attention to the importance of the 
ways we treat those we regard as responsible agents, he never distinguishes between being responsible and 
holding responsible, nor uses the phrase ‘holding responsible’ at all. 
 
6 Some philosophers deny that the emotions play this central role in blame, and instead hold more cognitive 
views of blame (see, for example, George Sher’s In Praise of Blame). These views are not my primary target in 
this paper. I am also not defending a particular view of blame. As such, I will remain agnostic as to whether 
holding someone responsible in the sense under discussion (that is, holding her to a norm) entails that she is 
the appropriate object of blame (in some sense or other) should she violate that norm. What I am claiming 
instead is that holding someone responsible need not entail the appropriateness of the negative reactive 
attitudes, even in response to norm violations. 
 
7 For more on this latter point, see section 3. 
 
8 Or, in the case of guilt, one does this with respect to oneself.   
 
9 “Enforcement” is sometimes associated with blame or punishment in response to norm violations. I am 
using this word more broadly, to mean roughly holding someone to a norm. 
 
10 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 15.  
 
11 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 15. 
 
12 We also characteristically take up the objective stance toward lower animals and inanimate objects, which is 
congruent with Strawson’s view that we take up the objective stance when we can’t sustain a certain kind of 
intimacy and reciprocity with that individual. Strawson claims that we can also take up the objective attitude 
toward anyone on a temporary basis for this kind of reason. As he writes, “We have this resource and can 
sometimes use it: as a refuge, say, from the strains of involvement; or as an aid to policy; or simply out of 
intellectual curiosity. Being human, we cannot, in the normal case, do this for long, or altogether” (Strawson 
10). 
 
13 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 10. 
 
14 In response to the incompatibilist determinist, Strawson insists that to take up the objective stance toward 
everyone all the time would be both inhuman and impossible. Because this argument is both well-known and 
not central to this paper, I will not rehearse it here. 
 
15 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 9. 
 
16 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 9. 
 
17 Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme.” 222-3. 
 
18 Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, 162.  
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19 Note that Wallace’s conception of the reactive attitudes is much narrower than Strawson’s. Specifically, the 
reactive attitudes on his view are resentment, indignation, and guilt. I will discuss his argument for this claim 
below. 
 
20 Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, 27. 
 
21 Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, 21.  
 
22 Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, 23. 
 
23 Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme.” 222. 
 
24 I use the locution ‘affective blame’ following Hanna Pickard, but it is more or less interchangeable with 
blame understood in terms of the negative reactive attitudes, and contrasted with blame understood as merely 
a negative cognitive evaluation of the agent in question. 
 
25 Joffe and Levitt, Conquering Depression: A Guide to Understanding Symptoms, Causes, and Treatment of Depressive 
Illness, 39. 
 
26 Friedman, “When All Else Fails, Blaming the Patient Often Comes Next,” 1. 
 
27 Friedman, “When All Else Fails, Blaming the Patient Often Comes Next,” 1. 
 
28 Pickard, “Responsibility without Blame: Philosophical Reflections on Clinical Practice,” 1134-5. 
29 Pickard, “Responsibility without Blame: Philosophical Reflections on Clinical Practice,” 1134.  
 
30 Pickard, “Responsibility without Blame: Philosophical Reflections on Clinical Practice,” 1134.  
 
31 Pickard, “Responsibility without Blame: Philosophical Reflections on Clinical Practice,” 1135.  
 
32 Pickard, “Responsibility without Blame: Philosophical Reflections on Clinical Practice,” 1141. 
 
33 Pickard, “Responsibility without Blame: Philosophical Reflections on Clinical Practice,” 1150. 
 
34 Pickard, “Responsibility without Blame: Philosophical Reflections on Clinical Practice,” 1144-5. 
 
35 Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” 269. 
 
36 Pickard, “Responsibility without Blame: Philosophical Reflections on Clinical Practice,” 1149. 
 
37 Pickard, “Responsibility without Blame: Philosophical Reflections on Clinical Practice,” 1144.  
 
38 The point here is not that behaviors associated with disorders of agency are moral failings, but rather that 
the kind of accountability that is at issue in therapeutic relationships is garden-variety accountability, which is 
typically characterized as (one kind of) moral responsibility. 
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39 This is not to say that the therapist only holds the patient responsible in a forward-looking sense. Assuming 
that the norm in question is a reasonable one and the patient is aware of it, there is no reason to think that 
she is not responsible for violating the norm in a backward-looking sense as well. 
 
40 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 18.  
 
41 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 10. 
 
42 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 10. 
 
43 I use the language of treating as a person rather than the language of the participant stance because I 
believe the precise relationship between my view and Strawson’s is complex. I share many of Strawson’s 
methodological commitments, but I want to shift the focus of holding responsible away from the reactive 
attitudes. 
 
44 The point here is not that children or psychiatric patients are never the appropriate objects of blame. If we 
do in fact have normative expectations of marginal agents and those expectations are reasonable, it is 
doubtful that these agents are never to blame for living up to them. We may blame marginal agents less often 
because we are less sure that our expectations are reasonable, and the tone of our blame typically is (and 
should be) softened by recognizing their vulnerability. But the same can be said of the grieving employee 
considered below, who is not a marginal agent.  
  
45 This example has an affinity with one Angela Smith discusses in “On Being Responsible and Holding 
Responsible.” Smith writes, “If a good friend of mine is under a lot of stress, for example, I may not ‘hold’ 
her responsible, in the sense of actively blaming her, for some insensitive comments she makes to me. I can 
judge both that she is responsible for her comments, and that she is open to legitimate moral criticism for 
them (because they are hurtful). But given the circumstances, I may decide that it would be uncharitable for 
me to take up attitudes of anger and resentment, or to explicitly reproach her in any way. In making such a 
judgment, however, and in renouncing these attitudes and responses, I need not think that my friend is not 
really responsible, or not really at fault, for her behavior.” (Smith (2007) 470). According to Smith, therefore, 
judging someone to be responsible (and perhaps even culpable) need not entail the justifiability of the 
negative reactive attitudes. In this I agree with Smith, but on my view holding someone responsible is 
fundamentally about holding her accountable with respect to a norm, not merely judging her to be 
responsible or attributing an action “...to her in a way that makes moral appraisal, in principle, appropriate.” 
(Smith (2007) 471). I also disagree with Smith that holding someone morally responsible in a backward-
looking sense is generally synonymous with blaming her (Smith (2007) 468). 
 
46 More precisely, praising or crediting someone with respect to some norm counts as holding her responsible 
if, had she violated that norm, she would also have been held responsible (e.g., by being blamed or punished 
in some way).   
 
47 Gary Watson, for example, famously argues that responsibility as accountability is not the only sense of 
responsibility relevant to our responsibility practices; there is also responsibility as attributability, which he 
describes as follows: “conduct can be attributable or imputable to an individual as its agent and is open to 
appraisal that is therefore appraisal of the individual as an adopter of ends. Attributability in this sense is a 
kind of responsibility. In virtue of the capacities in question, the individual is an agent in a strong sense, an 
author of her conduct, and is in an important sense answerable for what she does” (Watson (1996) 229). My 
interest here is not in denying that attributability could also be a form of responsibility, but in developing a 
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view of responsibility as accountability that captures the full array of cases in which we in fact hold each other 
accountable. 
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